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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
On its face, this case simply concerns the development of an aviation-themed residential 
subdivision adjacent to the Sandpoint Airport.  However, much more is at stake in this case beyond 
the parties involved or the claims and counterclaims that have been made.  This case will determine 
whether, and to what extent, the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be applied against a 
governmental entity so as to bind the entity to an obligation that was never approved by the entity’s 
governing board in accordance with Idaho law.  Thus, the outcome of this case has the potential to 
affect how local government works for a long time to come. 
The Plaintiff/Respondent, Silverwing at Sandpoint, LLC (“Silverwing”), has contended 
that it suffered damages based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel because it relied to its 
detriment on promises alleged to have been made by various representatives of Bonner County 
prior to and during the development process.  On the other hand, the Defendant/Appellant, Bonner 
County, has contended that the application of promissory estoppel is inappropriate in this case 
because, inter alia, no promises were ever made to Silverwing, and because any such promises 
could not be binding on the County because the persons who made them were not lawfully 
authorized to do so. 
B. Concise Statement of Facts 
Bonner County is a political subdivision of the State of Idaho.  It owns the Sandpoint 
Airport, which is located within the City of Sandpoint, pursuant to Title 21, Chapter 4, Idaho Code.  
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The Bonner County Board of Commissioners (“the Board”) exercises executive authority over the 
airport pursuant to section 21-401, Idaho Code. 
As part of its oversight of airport management and operations, the Board appoints an 
Airport Advisory Board (“the Advisory Board”), which was created by resolution of the Board in 
1999.  R. at 3137-41; R. Exh. at 351-54 (Defendant’s Exhibit A7)1.  The resolution specifies that 
the Advisory Board can make recommendations to the Board regarding operations, maintenance, 
budgeting, and grant funding, and other aspects of airport management, but it also emphasizes that 
the Board is the final authority over the airport and only the Board can bind the County with respect 
to any matter regarding the airport.  Id.   
In 1993, the Board approved an Airport Master Plan (“the Master Plan”) for the period of 
1993-2013.  R. at 2987-88; see also R. at 3044-45.  This Master Plan contained an Airport Layout 
Plan (“ALP”), which depicts the location and nature of existing and proposed airport facilities and 
structures.  Trial Tr. p. 1087, L. 8-22.  Bonner County’s 1993 ALP showed the airport’s runway 
moving sixty feet (60’) to the west of the then-current alignment in the future.  R. at 2987-88; see 
also R. at 3044-45.  The ALP was approved in conjunction with an update to the Master Plan by 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in November of 2003.  Id. 
On May 31, 1996, the Board entered into a contract with Robert Maurice, entitled “Lease 
of Airport Fixed-Base and Related Facilities” (“the Airport Lease”), the terms of which included 
                                            
1 In this brief, citations to the Amended Clerk’s Record on appeal will be referenced with the abbreviation “R.”  
Citations to the Amended Clerk’s Record of Trial Exhibits will be referenced with the abbreviation “R. Exh.,” and 
will include a parallel citation to the party and exhibit number (e.g., “Plaintiff’s Exh. 1”).  As there were multiple 




acting as the airport manager.  R. at 3080; R. Exh. at 17-45 (Plaintiff’s Exh. 3).  On June 5, 1996, 
Mr. Maurice assigned his rights to Jorge L. O'Leary.  Id.  
The Airport Lease included a determination by the Board that the “operation, management, 
and maintenance of such airport facilities constitute reasonable and necessary activities of the 
County.”  Id.  The Airport Lease provided that Mr. O'Leary would perform a number of ministerial 
duties, and also provided that he would “act as coordinator between Bonner County and ... 
contractors, federal and state agencies, pertaining to the improvement, protection, operation and 
maintenance of Airport properties and attendant facilities.”  Id.   The Airport Lease further stated 
that he would “confer with members of the Airport Commission, Bonner County Commissioners, 
or their designated representatives on aviation matters, which may include but shall not be limited 
to the interpretation of federal aviation agency rules and regulations, the adequacy of the existing 
airport facilities, and flight load capacities of the Airport.”  Id.  The airport has had at least six 
separate mid-field access points to its runway; three provide the only access from the west side of 
the runway which includes the mid-field access point shared by Silverwing and Quest Aircraft 
Company, Silverwing's northern neighbor.  R. at 3082. 
In 2005, the Board began the process to revise the ALP approved in 2003 to conform to 
the then-current runway alignment, thereby abandoning its previous plan to move it sixty feet to 
the west.  R. at 2988; R. Exh. at 356-59 (Defendant’s Exhibit A27).  Instead, the Board sought to 
adopt a new ALP that contemplated moving both the east and west taxiways to achieve the 240-
foot separation between runway and taxiway required by the FAA.  Id.  
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In April 2006, John McKeown purchased 18.1 acres of land immediately adjacent to the 
west side of the airport.  R. at 1071, 3081.  Shortly thereafter, that property was conveyed to 
Silverwing.  Id.  Silverwing intended to design and construct 45 hangar structures for airplanes 
with residences above the hangars (“the Development”), so that residents could have access to the 
airport runway.  Id.  To that end, the conveyance to Silverwing included a taxiway easement (“the 
Easement”) that Bonner County had originally granted to Silverwing’s predecessors in interest, 
which provided access through the airport fence to the runway.  Id.; see also R. Exh. at 50-67 
(Plaintiff’s Exh. 5-7). 
During the same month, Mr. McKeown requested a copy of the ALP on file with the FAA 
at that time from Mr. O’Leary.  R. Exh. at 82-84 (Plaintiff’s Exh. 32); Trial Tr. p. 299, L.3-p. 307, 
L. 19.  Mr. McKeown testified that Mr. O'Leary responded to this request by emailing him a copy 
of an ALP for the airport, and that he represented it was current and approved; however, in his 
deposition, Mr. O’Leary could not specifically recall providing an ALP to Silverwing or which 
ALP would have been provided.  R. Exh. at 82-84; Trial Tr. p. 299, L.3-p. 307, L. 19; p. 1094, L. 
12-p. 1099, L. 21.  Mr. McKeown also testified that the ALP that he was provided reflected the 
existing location of the runway and made no mention of plans to move it.  Id.  He also testified 
that Mr. O'Leary and Mark Napier, an engineer with the firm with which Bonner County had 
contracted as an engineering consultant for the airport, provided him with additional copies of an 
ALP depicting the runway in its current location.  Trial Tr. p. 350, L. 13-p. 351, L. 13. 
In late 2006, Silverwing attended numerous meetings related to the Development which 





would be amended to reflect the airport runway’s then-current orientation.  R. at 1047-48; Trial 
Tr. p. 336, L. 4-p. 338, L. 9; p. 344, L. 4-p. 351, L. 13; p. 441, L. 2-20.  Although Silverwing had 
originally intended to build a taxiway entirely on its property, the taxiway was moved at the 
County’s request to be partly on County property to accommodate the County's plans to build a 
west side taxiway for the entire length of the runway in its then-current location, pursuant to a 
development alternative identified as “Alternative 2(B).”  Trial Tr. p. 336, L. 4-p. 338, L. 9; p. 
344, L. 4-p. 351, L. 13.  Bonner County was seeking FAA approval of an ALP modification that 
reflected this alternative.  R. at 3096.  
In January of 2007, Silverwing submitted draft plans for construction of the Development 
to Mr. O'Leary.  Such plans were required to be submitted on a standard form provided by the 
FAA known as Form 7460-1, entitled “Notice of Proposed Construction or Alteration,” and were 
subject to approval of both Bonner County and the FAA.  R. Exh. at 144-49 (Plaintiff’s Exh. 60); 
Trial Tr. p. 366, L. 9-p. 377, L. 25.  Messrs. O’Leary and Napier offered comments to Silverwing’s 
proposed Form 7460-1, and those comments were incorporated into the final draft.  R. Exh. at 156-
63 (Plaintiff’s Exhibits 62, 65, 68 and 69).  Although those comments did not indicate that 
Silverwing's submission was based on an unapproved ALP, there is evidence that Silverwing’s 
engineers were aware of this.  R. Exh. at 306-08 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 150); R. Exh. at 379-82 
(Defendant’s Exhibits B8 and B9); R. Exh. at 403-07 (Defendant’s Exhibits E44 and E46). 
On February 14, 2007, Mr. O’Leary submitted Silverwing’s final Form 7460 to the FAA.  
R. Exh. at 164 (Plaintiff’s Exh. 70.)  During this time, Silverwing also sent plans for the design 
and construction of a 1,098 foot west parallel taxiway at the Airport to the County via FAA Form 
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7480, entitled “Notice of Landing Area Proposal.”  R. Exh. at 150-55 (Plaintiff’s Exh. 61); Trial 
Tr. p. 366, L. 9-p. 377, L. 25. 
On February 20, 2007, the Planning Commission for the City of Sandpoint held a public 
hearing to consider planned unit development (PUD) approval and preliminary subdivision 
approval of Silverwing’s application for the Development.  R. Exh. at 165-71 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 
71).  During this meeting, then-Advisory Board Chairman Terry McConnaughey was asked if the 
proposal would impact the long-term development of the Airport.  R. Exh. at 168.  He replied that 
“there are no plans for major development for runway length, except for the taxiway on the left 
side, which Silverwing is developing within FAA guidelines.”  Id.  At the conclusion of that 
hearing, the Planning Commission approved the application.  R. Exh. at 170-71. 
On March 21, 2007, the Sandpoint City Council held a public hearing to consider final 
PUD and preliminary subdivision approval of Silverwing’s application for the Development.  R. 
Exh. at 174-81 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 75).  During this meeting, McConnaughey once again expressed 
support for the project.  R. Exh. at 177.  The City Council approved the application at the 
conclusion of that meeting.  R. Exh. at 179-81. 
In April of 2007, Silverwing and Bonner County entered into a “Through-the-Fence 
Agreement” (“the TTFA”).  R. Exh. at 191-99 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 76).  On April 16, 2007, the 
Advisory Board recommended that the Board approve the TTFA, and the Board approved the 
TTFA on April 27, 2007.  R. Exh. at 192.  The TTFA reads, in pertinent part: 
4. Conditions and Restrictions.  [Silverwing’s] right hereunder to access the 
Airport shall be subject to the following conditions: 
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a. [Silverwing] shall comply with all applicable present and future:  
(i) rules, regulations, and other requirements of the FAA or any successor federal 
regulatory agency;  
(ii) laws of the State of Idaho and of the United States of America, including without 
limitation, statutes, rules, regulation, ordinances and codes; and  
(iii) County and City laws, rules, regulations, ordinances, and codes, including 
without limitation rules and regulations of the Airport Board; 
b. All plans, designs and specifications for security measures and means of access, 
shall be subject to the prior review and approval by the Airport Board, and 
[Silverwing] shall also obtain and submit to the Airport Board all approvals which 
may be required by the FAA from time to time … 
5. Access Fee. ...  It is acknowledged that [Silverwing] is constructing 44 residential 
airplane hangars.… 
13. Remedy Upon Breach.  Should either party hereto breach any of its obligations 
hereunder and fail to cure such default within thirty (30) days after written notice 
of the breach given by the other party, then such other party may terminate this 
Agreement and pursue such other remedies as may be available at law.... 
14. General Provisions.  The parties hereto agree to the following general 
provisions: … 
d. Modification.  This Agreement shall not be modified by either party by oral 
representations made before or after the execution of this Agreement.  All 
modifications must be in writing and signed by the parties. 
R. Exh. at 194-97. 
This is when the Development started to get sideways with the FAA.  Correspondence 
dated April 30, 2007 and May 3, 2007 from Trang Tran, a civil engineer with the FAA’s Seattle 
Airports District Office, demonstrated that the FAA had concerns about the Development.  R. Exh. 
at 200-01 (Plaintiff’s Exhibits 81 and 84).  While the April 30, 2007 letter stated that the FAA had 
no objection to the construction of the 1,098-foot parallel taxiway, it specifically stated that “[t]his 
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airspace determination should not be construed to mean FAA approval of the physical 
development involved in the proposal.”  R. Exh. at 200.  The May 3, 2007 letter then informed 
Bonner County of the following: 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has completed its review of your 
proposal to develop a 44-hangar subdivision ... with airport access using through-
the-fence (TTF) operation ... as shown on the sketch attached to your Notice of 
Proposed Construction of Alteration (FAA Form 7460 1) dated January 31, 2007. 
It has been determined that the proposal would not exceed the standard of [FAA] 
Regulation Part 77.  Therefore, we have no objection to the proposed development, 
provided that the TTF Agreement between [the parties] is approved by our office.  
The Agreement ... must be in compliance with [FAA Rules] and the Airport Layout 
Plan (ALP). 
We note that the 7460-1 plans for two FBO building and for hangars that will have 
a loft with living or office spaces.  ... Additionally, residential use adjacent to a 
public airport is considered an incompatible land use and the airport should not 
encourage or participate in permitting such development.  The fact that there is 
aircraft parking collocated with a residence does not change the fact that that it is 
[a] residential use.  Therefore, we encourage you to ensure through your [ITFA] 
that access is not provided to hangars with residences. 
R. Exh. at 201 (emphasis in original).  Silverwing’s representatives were made aware of the FAA’s 
concerns.  R. Exh. at 203-09 (Plaintiff’s Exhibits 88, 89 and 96). 
Notwithstanding the FAA’s stated concerns, however, Silverwing began construction of 
the Development in September of 2007.  R. at 3091; Trial Tr. p. 385, L. 8-p. 386, L. 9.  This work 
cost approximately $4,950,000, including the construction of a 1,098-foot taxiway along the west 
side of the Airport at a cost of approximately $650,000.  R. at 3091; Trial Tr. p. 387, L. 8-19.  On 
December 5, 2008, the FAA sent then-Board Chairman Lewis Rich a letter stating that allowing 
Silverwing and others through-the-fence access, and allowing Silverwing to construct a 
development with a residential component adjacent to the airport, violated Grant Assurance Nos. 
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5, 19 and 21.  R. Exh. at 232-34 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 109).  Accordingly, the FAA placed the airport 
on the “FAA Airports Non-Compliance List” for three years.  Id.  The airport would be ineligible 
for FAA funding during that period unless the FAA and Bonner County could come to a 
satisfactory resolution of those issues.  Id. 
In response to the FAA’s determination of non-compliance status, Bonner County adopted 
a corrective action plan (CAP) on January 29, 2009.  R. Exh. at 235-38 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 110).  
Among other things, the CAP sought to pursue an extinguishment or amendment to the perpetual 
nature of the Silverwing easement agreement and TTFA; pursue an amendment to the TTFA that 
expressly subordinates the agreement to Bonner County’s grant assurances with the FAA; and 
pursue an amendment to the Silverwing and Quest TTFAs to require access only at the end of the 
runway, with the County recognizing FAA’s position that midfield access is unacceptable from a 
safety perspective.  Id.  The FAA accepted the CAP in part, and rejected it in part, via letter dated 
February 25, 2009.  R. Exh. at 398 (Defendant’s Exhibit D3). 
In January of 2009, Advisory Board member Chris Popov contacted Silverwing to discuss 
the ramifications of the December 5, 2008 FAA non-compliance letter.  R. Exh. at 301-04 
(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 142).  He did so again on March 8, 2009 in an email setting forth the FAA’s 
concens in detail.  R. Exh. at 399-400 (Defendant’s Exhibit D5).  Mr. Popov testified that the 
provision in the CAP regarding extinguishment or amendment to the Silverwing easement 
agreement and TTFA was included because that was the only way the FAA would approve the 
CAP.  Trial Tr. p. 1362, L. 8-p. 1365, L. 3. 
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On March 25, 2009, the FAA notified Bonner County that Silverwing’s taxiway had not 
been constructed in accordance with the ALP previously approved by the FAA, which depicted 
the future relocation of the airport’s runway 60 feet to the west to provide 240 feet of separation 
between the runway and taxiways.  R. Exh. at 241 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 114).  According to Mr. 
McKeown, during July 2009, Mr. Popov informed Silverwing that it may need to relocate the 
existing taxiway 60 feet to the west at its own expense.  R. at 1262, 1290-93.  Silverwing objected 
to the County’s demand, arguing that it built the taxiway based upon the ALP depicting the current 
location of the runway.  Id.   
From 2009 to 2011, Silverwing and Bonner County negotiated with the FAA to resolve the 
Airport's non-compliance status.  Passim.  In September of 2009, the County and Silverwing 
entered into a Letter of Intent evidencing a possible purchase of the Silverwing property in its 
entirety by the County, though Silverwing ultimately rescinded that agreement in a letter dated 
February 4, 2010.  R. Exh. at 401 (Defendant’s Exh. D50A).  Notably, that letter also stated the 
following: 
[Silverwing] remains very optimistic about the future of Sandpoint Airport and the 
Sandpoint Community and we are steadfast in our desire to work with Bonner 
County to make the Sandpoint Airport an even more special destination and 
economic generator than it is today.  We will be moving forward with lot sales and 
building sales at our development and we look forward to generating new jobs and 
other income sources for the entire community.  It has been a pleasure working with 
Mr. Popov and we look forward to working with the airport board and Bonner 
County in the future…. 
Id. 
In March of 2011, Compliance Guidance Letter 2011-1, the FAA’s interim policy 
permitting existing residential developments with through-the-fence access points to continue to 
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operate, went into effect.  R. Exh. at 402 (Defendant’s Exh. E40).  On October 11, 2011, the County 
approved an amended ALP depicting the future relocation of both the runway and the taxiway 60 
feet to the west of their respective then-existing locations, and also depicting the acquisition of a 
portion of Silverwing’s development to accommodate this plan.  R. at 1214-18, 1231-34; R. Exh. 
at 253 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 121).  The FAA approved this amended ALP on October 24, 2011.  Id.  
In December of 2011, the County submitted an amended CAP to the FAA depicting the future 
relocation of the runway and taxiway 60 feet to the west and acquisition of a parcel of Silverwing’s 
Development, consistent with its October 2011 updated ALP.  R. at 1218-22, 1235-40.  
In 2012, Congress passed legislation rescinding the previous prohibition on residential 
through-the-fence agreements.  Pub. L. 112-95 § 136, 126 Stat. 23-24 (amending 49 U.S.C. § 
47107); Trial Tr. p. 1369, L. 22-p. 1370, L. 3.  In early 2015, the County submitted a new ALP 
which showed the runway remaining in its current location consistent with Alternative 2(B).  R. at 
3096; Trial Tr. p. 1370, L. 3-11.  The runway and the taxiway that Silverwing built are in the 
location depicted in the 2015 ALP, consistent with Alternative 2(B), and have not moved from the 
time Mr. McKeown purchased the Silverwing property until today.  Trial Tr. p. 1370, L. 12-21. 
C. Course of Proceedings 
On May 11, 2012, Silverwing filed this action in the District Court in Bonner County.  R. 
at 40-57.  The County then removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho.  
Silverwing at Sandpoint, LLC v. Bonner County, No. 2:12-CV-00287-EJL, 2014 WL 66296000 
(D. Idaho Nov. 21, 2014).  The County moved for summary judgment.  Id. at *3-*4.  The U.S. 
District Court granted the County’s motion on all claims with the sole exception of the promissory 
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estoppel claim, and remanded that claim to the state District Court.  Id. at *6-*13; see also R. at 
157-59. 
On May 1, 2015, the County moved for judgment on the pleadings, and subsequently filed 
an alternative motion for summary judgment.  R. at 168-246.  Prior to the hearing set for County’s 
motions, County amended its Answer to include two counterclaims: breach of contract and breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  R. at 2957-3020.   On April 13, 2016, the District 
Court denied the County's motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment.  R. at 
3053-74.  On July 27, 2016 Silverwing moved for summary judgment as to County's two 
counterclaims.  R. at 3075-77.  On September 8, 2016, the District Court granted Silverwing’s 
motion in part and denied it in part.  R. at 3303-28. 
A jury trial of this matter was held from November 16, 2016 to November 22, 2016.  Trial 
Tr. p. 2, L. 4-10.  During trial, the County moved for a directed verdict.  Trial Tr. p. 1176 L. 1-p. 
1214, L. 15.  The Court denied the motion.  Trial Tr. at 1422.  At the conclusion of the trial, the 
jury found that Bonner County was liable to Silverwing in the amount of $250,000.  R. at 4902-
05; Trial Tr. p. 1577, L. 11-p. 1579, L. 13.  After trial, the County moved for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, essentially renewing the motion for a directed verdict it had made 
during trial.  R. at 4908-10.  On March 17, 2017, the District Court denied that motion.  R. at 5727-
48.  The County appealed this matter to this Court on April 14, 2017.  R. at 5821-29. 
In the meantime, Silverwing appealed the decision of the U.S. District Court to the Ninth 
U.S. Court of Appeals.  Silverwing at Sandpoint, LLC v. Bonner County, 2017 WL 4995822 (9th 
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Cir. Nov. 1, 2017).  The Court of Appeals issued its decision affirming the U.S. District Court on 
November 1, 2017.  Id. 
II. ISSUES DISCUSSED IN THIS BRIEF 
A. Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel may ever be the basis for a cause of 
action against a governmental entity. 
B. Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel should be applied upon the facts of 
this case. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings 
The standard of review of a decision on a motion for summary judgment is de novo; i.e., 
this Court reviews the motion based upon the same standard as the court below.  Massey v. 
ConAgra Foods, Inc., 156 Idaho 476, 479-80, 328 P.3d 456, 459-60 (2014).  That standard is 
whether “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Massey, 156 Idaho at 479, 328 P.3d at 459, quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c).  The record 
is to be liberally construed, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn, in favor of the non-
moving party.  Id.  If the evidence is conflicting on material issues, or if reasonable minds could 
reach different conclusions, summary judgment is not appropriate.  Id. 
The standard of review of a decision on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same 
as that of a motion for summary judgment.  State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 474, 163 P.3d 1183, 
1186 (2007).  In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, however, the moving party is 
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deemed to have admitted the allegations of the opposing party’s pleadings, and also admits the 
untruth of its own pleadings to the extent they have been denied.  Id. 
B. Directed Verdict and Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
A decision on a motion for a directed verdict under I.R.C.P. 50(a), or on a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict under I.R.C.P. 50(b), is purely a question of law, and this 
Court applies the same standard of review to each.  Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 
1187, 1191 (1986).  This standard is also de novo, with this Court applying the same standard as 
the trial court which made the original decision on the motion.  Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 
897, 104 P.3d 367, 371 (2004). 
The Court is to determine whether there exists substantial evidence to justify submitting 
the case to the jury.  Id.  In making this determination, the truth of the adverse evidence is deemed 
admitted, and all legitimate inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.  Id.  
“Substantial evidence” is defined as evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that 
reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the party against whom the motion is 
made is proper.  Id.  On the other hand, such a motion is properly granted whenever the evidence 
is so clear that all reasonable minds would only reach the conclusion that the moving party must 
prevail.  Id.  Motions for judgments notwithstanding the verdict are treated as delayed (or renewed) 
motions for a directed verdict, and they are intended to provide the court with the last opportunity 




C. Jury Instructions 
The standard by which the acceptance or rejection of jury instructions is whether the 
instructions, as a whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law that applies in 
that case.  Smith, 140 Idaho at 897, 104 P.3d at 371.  No reversible error occurs as long as the 
instructions, taken as a whole, are not misleading and do not prejudice any party to the action.  Id. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. This Court should hold that promissory estoppel cannot be the basis for a cause of 
action against a governmental entity performing a governmental function. 
1. The planning, management and operation of a public airport is a governmental 
function. 
Silverwing has sought an award of damages against Bonner County based on the theory of 
promissory estoppel.  Promissory estoppel, along with its sister remedies of equitable estoppel and 
quasi-estoppel, each require the allegation of a promise or representation by the person or entity 
against which the applicable form of estoppel is to be asserted.  Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n v. State 
ex rel. Idaho Dept. of Fish and Game, 154 Idaho 716, 723, 302 P.3d 341, 348 (2012).  In general, 
estoppel is not applicable against governmental entities acting in a sovereign or governmental 
capacity, but “may apply where required by notions of justice or fair play.”  Id.   Thus, the first 
question to be addressed is whether the County’s planning and management of the Sandpoint 
Airport is a governmental function. 
As stated above, this matter centers around the location of an aviation-themed residential 
development, including the construction of a taxiway, in relation to: 1) the actual location of the 
airport’s lone runway, 2) the future location of the runway as depicted in the FAA-approved ALP 
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at the time the infrastructure for the development, including the taxiway, was constructed, and 3) 
the future location of the runway as depicted in the draft ALP for which Bonner County was 
seeking approval from the FAA at all times relevant to this matter, which was finally granted in 
2015.  See Trial Tr. at 188-92.  The Idaho Legislature has provided that the acquisition, 
construction, operation and maintenance of public airports in Idaho is a governmental function.  
Idaho Code §§ 21-110, 21-401.  In addition, planning activities involving policy formulation have 
been recognized as governmental functions that are immune from tort liability, even before 
statutory changes were made to also make other governmental functions immune from tort 
liability.  See Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 230, 723 P.2d 755, 774 (1986), superseded by 
enactment of Idaho Code §§ 6-904A through 6-904(c), see Harris v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Health 
and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 301, 847 P.2d 1156, 1162 (1992). 
2. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is generally not applicable against a 
governmental entity performing a governmental function, and is strongly 
disfavored. 
 
The next question is whether, and under what circumstances, it may be appropriate for a 
court to apply the doctrine of estoppel against a governmental entity performing a governmental 
function.  This Court has set forth the elements of equitable estoppel as follows: 
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or 
constructive knowledge of the truth, 
(2) the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth, 
(3) the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied 
upon and 
(4) the person to whom the representation was made or from whom the facts were 




Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 22, 644 P.2d 341, 344 (1982).  
Similarly, the doctrine of quasi-estoppel “prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment 
of another party, which is inconsistent with a position previously taken.”  Allen v. Reynolds, 145 
Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008).  The elements of quasi-estoppel are as follows: 
(1) the offending party took a different position than his or her original position, 
and 
(2) either: 
(a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the 
other party; 
(b) the other party was induced to change positions; or 
(c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an 
inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit or 
acquiesced in. 
Id.  Prior decisions of this Court, including those discussed below, are evidence of this Court’s 
reluctance to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel against a local 
governmental entity in the exercise of a governmental function.   
In Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506 P.2d 470 (1973), this Court discussed the 
history of its prior decisions regarding the application of estoppel against governmental entities, 
and also discussed the fact that some jurisdictions had refused to do so in any circumstance 
concerning the enactment or enforcement of zoning regulations, while other jurisdictions would 
do so only under “extraordinary circumstances.”  Harrell, 95 Idaho at 247-48, 506 P.2d at 474-75.  
The Harrell Court then adopted the “extraordinary circumstances” rule, but found that no exigency 
existed such as would estop the City of Lewiston from refusing to issue a building permit based 
on the zoning of the property at issue.  Id. at 248-49, 506 P.2d at 475-76. 
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A later case considered the application of estoppel to an instance in which a city entered 
into an agreement with a developer in 1973, and then subsequently rezoned the property in 1993 
in a manner inconsistent with the original 1973 agreement.  Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. 
City of Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 578-80, 903 P.2d 741, 743-45 (1995).  In that case, the City of 
Hailey conceded that the property owner’s predecessor in interest had fulfilled the terms and 
conditions of the agreement.  Id. at 579, 903 P.2d at 744.  The then-current property owner had 
contended that the City of Hailey should have been estopped from changing its position as to its 
obligations under the development agreement, since the City had “received the benefit of its 
bargain.”  Id. at 582-83, 903 P.2d at 747-48.  The Court, however, found that the application of 
estoppel was not appropriate because the City did not breach the agreement, the agreement did not 
impose a “regulatory freeze” on the property in question, and the property owner did not rely to 
its detriment on the prior zoning as opposed to the new zoning.  Id. at 582-83, 903 P.2d at 747-48. 
Most recently, this Court has had occasion to extend the rule from Harrell and Sprenger to 
a case involving a representation that a county planner had made with respect to a subdivision 
application.  Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193, 200-01, 207 P.3d 169, 176-77 (2009).  In 
that case, the property owners had applied for preliminary subdivision approval based on planning 
staff’s interpretation that the property in question did not lie within Blaine County’s “Mountain 
Overlay District” (MOD).  Id.  They had contended that because they had relied on this 
interpretation to their detriment in the form of expenditures of large sums of money in preparing 
the subdivision application, the county should be estopped from denying the application on the 
basis that the property was within the MOD.  Id.  This Court, however, once again declined to 
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apply the doctrine of estoppel in this matter, expressly finding that the result of doing so would be 
that “all future boards of commissioners in similar circumstances would be estopped from 
disagreeing with the opinions of staff members simply because a landowner expended money in 
reliance on those opinions.”  Id. at 177. 
Although these cases each involved claims of equitable estoppel or quasi-estoppel in the 
context of a land use application, their reasoning applies equally to decisions of a local governing 
board performing other governmental functions, including policy decisions related to the planning, 
management and operation of a public airport.  For the reasons discussed below, this reluctance 
should apply to an even greater degree with respect to the application of promissory estoppel under 
such circumstances. 
3. No Idaho appellate decisions have applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
against a governmental entity. 
This Court has expressed the elements of promissory estoppel as follows: 
(1) the detriment suffered in reliance was substantial in an economic sense; 
(2) substantial loss to the promisee acting in reliance was or should have been 
foreseeable by the promisor; and 
(3) the promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise 
as made. 
Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, LLC, 138 Idaho 27, 29, 56 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2002).  Of course, 
there must have been a promise made in order to apply this doctrine.  Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n, 
154 Idaho at 723, 302 P.3d at 348.  Whenever promissory estoppel is applied, it acts as a substitute 
for consideration.  Gillespie, 138 Idaho at 30, 56 P.3d at 1280. 
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To the best of the undersigned’s knowledge, this Court has never applied the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel when one of the parties has been a governmental entity.  See Idaho Wool 
Growers Ass’n, 154 Idaho at 723, 302 P.3d at 348 (document relied upon by plaintiff contained no 
promises); Brown v. Caldwell Sch. Dist., 127 Idaho 112, 117-18, 898 P.2d 43, 48-49 (1995) 
(employee did not have right to rely on statement by assistant superintendent regarding continued 
employment where such decision could only be made by the school board in accordance with 
section 33-513, Idaho Code); Gilbert v. City of Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 391-92, 732 P.2d 355, 
360-61 (1987) (statement indicated “hope or expectation” rather than an oral promise, which in 
any event was superseded by the written promises made in exchange for a grant of easement); see 
also Mitchell v. Bingham Mem. Hosp., 130 Idaho 420, 425, 942 P.2d 544, 549 (1997) (promissory 
estoppel did not act to waive requirement to file written notice of tort claim). 
These cases show that although this Court has indicated that it is possible for the doctrine 
of estoppel, in general, to be applied against a governmental entity in extraordinary circumstances, 
in practice, it has found claims based on promissory estoppel, in particular, to be lacking in some 
manner.  What these cases have not addressed to date, however, is whether promissory estoppel 
should ever be applied against a governmental entity performing a governmental function.  There 
are several reasons why the Court should answer this question in the negative. 
4. The application of promissory estoppel against a governmental entity would result 
in the formation of a binding obligation in a manner which is unconstitutional, 
violates the Open Meetings Law, and ignores longstanding case law. 
The application of promissory estoppel differs from equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel 
in that it provides an element necessary for the formation of a contract.  This is highly concerning 
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for all governmental entities, and particularly counties, because it would provide any party with a 
contractually based grievance against a governmental entity with a “backdoor” means to obtain a 
legally binding obligation from that entity without having to adhere to such procedural niceties 
such as open meetings, a decision of a majority of a quorum of the governing board, or a public 
hearing when one is required.  In addition, it would fail to respect the scope of the duties of an 
advisory board to make recommendations to a governing board, rather than making decisions for 
it, and would undo the prerogative of the governing board to disagree with its staff, as this Court 
articulated in Terrazas, including members of its advisory boards. 
a. The powers and duties specifically and exclusively assigned to boards of 
county commissioners under the Constitution and laws of the State of Idaho 
preclude the application of promissory estoppel. 
Article XVIII, Section 10 of the Idaho Constitution provides for boards of county 
commissioners for each county in Idaho.  The board of county commissioners is the chief executive 
authority of county government.  Reynolds Const. Co. v. Twin Falls County, 92 Idaho 61, 66, 437 
P.2d 14, 19 (1968).  Article XVIII, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution provides for all of the 
elected county officers, including county commissioners, and also very emphatically expresses the 
policy that the laws pertaining to county officials “shall provide for the strict accountability of 
county … officers for all fees which may be collected by them, and for all public or municipal 
moneys which may be paid to them, or officially come into their possession.”  Idaho Const., art. 
XVIII, § 6 (emphasis added). 
In keeping with that directive, the powers and duties of boards of county commissioners 




purchase, receive by donation, or lease any real or personal property necessary for the use of the 
county; [and to] preserve, take care of, manage and control the county property….”  Idaho Code § 
31-807.  For over eighty years, this Court has consistently held that this power is exclusive to the 
board of county commissioners, even as against other elected officials who have sufficient money 
in their budgets to purchase such property.  Magoon v. Valley County, 58 Idaho 317, 73 P.2d 80, 
81-82 (1937); see also Clayton v. Barnes, 52 Idaho 418, 16 P.2d 1056, 1058-59 (1932) (salaries 
for clerical staff and attorney hired by county assessor without authorization of the county 
commissioners were not legal charges against the county). 
In addition, this Court has held as far back as 1896 that “a board of county commissioners 
is an entity and can only act to bind the county when sitting as a board.”  Conger v. Latah County, 
4 Idaho 740, 48 P. 1064, 1064 (1896).  Whenever individual members, “acting individually and 
separately,” authorize an expenditure, it is void even if all the commissioners were in agreement; 
only “the county commissioners acting as a board that are given that authority.”  Id. 2 
More recently, the Idaho Legislature has enacted a number of provisions to promote local 
government transparency, which are now codified together as Title 74 of the Idaho Code.  One of 
these provisions is the Open Meetings Law, found at Title 74, Chapter 2, Idaho Code.  This chapter 
begins with the legislative declaration that “it is the policy of this state that the formation of public 
policy is public business and shall not be conducted in secret.”  Idaho Code § 74-201.  Thus, with 
certain exceptions not germane to this matter, “all meetings of a governing body of a public agency 
                                            
2 In the 2017 legislative session, the Idaho Legislature carved out a limited exception authorizing boards of county 
commissioners to delegate purchasing power to other elected officials or county employees.  See 2017 Idaho Sess. 
Laws, Vol. 1, Ch. 197, p. 482 (Senate Bill No. 1074, as amended). 
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shall be open to the public,” and “no decision at a meeting of a governing body of a public agency 
shall be made by secret ballot.”  Idaho Code § 74-203. 
The Open Meetings Law defines “decision” as “any determination, action, vote or final 
disposition upon a motion, proposal, resolution, order, ordinance or measure on which a vote of a 
governing body is required, at any meeting at which a quorum is present.”  Idaho Code § 74-
202(1).  It also defines “deliberation” as “the receipt or exchange of information or opinion relating 
to a decision.”  Idaho Code § 74-202(2).  It then makes it abundantly clear that any “action, or any 
deliberation or decision-making that leads to an action, [that] occurs at any meeting which fails to 
comply with the provisions of this chapter … shall be null and void.”  Idaho Code § 74-208(1) 
(emphasis added).  This Court has previously held that recovery cannot be had on a void contract 
with a board of county commissioners under the theory of quantum meruit.  Hampton v. Logan 
County, 4 Idaho 646, 43 P. 324, 325-26 (1896).  It follows that recovery should not be available 
under the theory of promissory estoppel based on a promise that is void because it was made in 
violation of the Open Meetings Law. 
b. The application of promissory estoppel against a governmental entity would 
cause that entity to assume a debt or liability for a period of greater than 
one year in violation of Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. 
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution provides as follows: 
No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other subdivision of the 
state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for any purpose, 
exceeding in that year, the income and revenue provided for it for such year, 
without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof voting at an 
election to be held for that purpose….  Any indebtedness or liability incurred 
contrary to this provision shall be void: Provided, that this section shall not be 
construed to apply to the ordinary and necessary expenses authorized by the general 
laws of the state …. 
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Idaho Const. art. VII, § 3 (emphasis added).  The primary purpose of this section is to protect 
taxpayers and citizens of the various political subdivisions of the state, as they are the ones who 
would ultimately bear the consequences of excessive indebtedness or liability.  Koch v. Canyon 
County, 145 Idaho 158, 162, 177 P.3d 372, 376 (2008). 
This Court has held that contracts for various projects in which the expenditure exceeded, 
or was to exceed, the revenue available in that fiscal year, were not ordinary and necessary 
expenses, and therefore were void under the prohibition contained in this section.  See, e.g., Dexter 
Horton Trust and Savings Bank v. Clearwater County, 235 F. 743, 750-57 (D. Idaho 1916) (cruise 
of timber lands on behalf of county assessor); City of Challis v. Consent of the Governed Caucus, 
159 Idaho 398, 400-05, 361 P.3d 485, 487-92 (2015) (repair and replacement of components of 
city water system); City of Boise v. Frasier, 143 Idaho 1, 2-6, 137 P.3d 388, 389-93 (2006) (airport 
parking garage expansion held to be ordinary but not necessary expense).   
It is important to note that this provision is not merely limited to indebtedness, but also 
applies to liability.  This Court has stated that people “contract debts; they incur liabilities.  In the 
one case they act affirmatively; in the other, the liability is incurred or cast upon them by act or 
operation of law.”  Boise Dev. Co. v. City of Boise, 26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531, 534 (1914), overruled 
on other grounds, Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 438-39, 670 P.2d 839, 845-46 (1983).  
In that case, the Court also adopted the definition of liability as “[r]esponsibility.  The state of one 
who is bound in law and justice to do something which may be enforced by action.  This liability 
may arise from contracts either express or implied, or in consequence of torts committed.  The 
state of being bound or obliged in law or justice.”  Boise Dev. Co., 143 P. at 534. 
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This Court has yet to consider the interplay between equitable doctrines that result in 
liability in contract or tort and the constitutional limitation on the incursion of indebtedness or 
liability in excess of one year contained in Article VIII, Section 3.  However, it stands to reason 
that if a local governmental entity such as a county cannot incur indebtedness or liability on an 
express contractual obligation exceeding the revenue available in that fiscal year, it also should 
not be able to do so by making a promise to incur such indebtedness or liability, and a court should 
not be able to enforce such a promise by operation of promissory estoppel.  Therefore, to the extent 
that a promise made by a governmental entity purports to bind the entity to an indebtedness or 
liability exceeding the revenue available in that fiscal year, that promise is void as a violation of 
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. 
As discussed above, this Court has historically been reluctant to apply the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel against a governmental entity performing a governmental function.  With 
respect to promissory estoppel specifically, the case against applying this doctrine against a 
governmental entity is even more compelling, since it would result in the enforcement of a 
contractual obligation in a manner outside of the procedures set forth in the Open Meetings Law, 
and contrary to other Idaho statutory and case law dating back nearly to statehood.  In addition, 
the application of promissory estoppel can lead to the creation of an indebtedness or liability 
exceeding the revenue available to that entity in that fiscal year in violation of Article VIII, Section 
3 of the Idaho Constitution.  This would fly directly in the face of the public policies of government 
transparency and the prudent expenditure of public funds. 
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5. The application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against a governmental 
entity is also strongly disfavored in other jurisdictions. 
Other jurisdictions that have addressed the application of promissory estoppel against a 
governmental entity have taken different approaches to this issue.  Some jurisdictions allow for its 
application under extraordinary circumstances, the same approach this Court has taken with 
respect to equitable estoppel.  See Harrell, 95 Idaho at 247-49, 506 P.2d at 474-76.  Other 
jurisdictions have adopted an absolute rule against applying promissory estoppel against 
governmental entities.  See Phipps Products Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 443 
N.E.2d 115, 118 (Mass. 1982). 
An example of a state which has at least recognized the ability to state a claim of 
promissory estoppel against a governmental entity is Ohio.  See Current Source, Inc. v. Elyria City 
Sch. Dist., 813 N.E.2d 730, 737-38 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).  In Current Source, the Ohio Court of 
Appeals refused to apply promissory estoppel against a school district which had sought proposals 
for survey work in connection with technological upgrades.  Current Source, 813 N.E.2d at 737.  
In that case, the court pointed out that “a board of education, through which a school district acts, 
may be estopped only by the conduct of the board itself and not by the conduct of employees who 
have no power to act on the board’s behalf.”  Id.  Additionally, it stated that “appellants had the 
responsibility of determining whether the alleged conduct in question was made in accordance 
with all applicable laws of Ohio....”  Id. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court has reached the same result for similar reasons.  In New 
Mexico, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against a governmental entity, but only 
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in exceptional situations involving a “shocking degree of aggravated and over-reaching conduct” 
on the part of the governmental entity.  State ex rel. State Hwy. Dept. v. Yurcic, 511 P.2d 546, 548-
50 (N.M. 1973).  However, the court refused to apply promissory estoppel against a county which 
had offered the plaintiff a two-year term of employment when that offer was made in violation of 
New Mexico’s Open Meetings Act.  Trujillo v. Gonzales, 747 P.2d 915, 916-17 (N.M. 1987).  The 
court stated that the plaintiff had no right to rely on the oral representations regarding the promise 
of a two-year term because people are charged with notice of the limitations on the powers of 
public officials when they are dealing with them.  Id. at 917. 
On the other hand, an example of a state which has barred the application of promissory 
estoppel against a governmental entity is Massachusetts.  See Phipps, 443 N.E.2d at 118.  In 
Phipps, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court articulated several compelling reasons for this 
position which this Court should find persuasive.  First of all, the court found that “the public 
interest in compliance with bidding procedures overrides the equities that would appropriately be 
considered in a purely private transaction.”  Id.  It noted that it “has been reluctant to apply 
principles of estoppel to public entities where to do so would negate requirements of law intended 
to protect the public interest.”  Id.  Finally, it quoted a prior decision which stated that “[t]he public 
interest in the enforcement of the laws of the Commonwealth cannot be defeated by failures of 
public officials to perform their duties.”  Id., quoting Doris v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 373 
N.E.2d 944, 948-49 (Mass. 1978). 
Whether they absolutely prohibit the application of promissory estoppel against a 
governmental entity or they allow for the possibility of its application in extraordinary 
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circumstances, the cases cited above from other jurisdictions all stand for the proposition that the 
only agreements or promises that can be made binding on a governmental entity are ones that have 
been made in compliance with the applicable laws of that state.  None of them have allowed such 
an agreement, representation, or promise to be enforced if such action was performed in violation 
of those laws.  This Court should, at the very least, do the same. 
6. The application of doctrine of promissory estoppel against a governmental entity 
would unduly disrupt governmental operations. 
Aside from the legal ramifications of applying promissory estoppel to impose a contractual 
obligation against a governmental entity in derogation of longstanding constitutional and statutory 
requirements, the application of promissory estoppel in this situation would cause major 
disruptions in governmental operations.  For one, it would make hiring contractors or consultants 
problematic, to the extent that a contractor or consultant could be found to have been acting with 
apparent authority to make a statement interpreted as a promise that ultimately binds the governing 
board to a contractual obligation it never intended, and most likely did not include in its budget.  
The same principle would also apply to individual commissioners and staff members, having a 
chilling effect on communications with the constituents whom they serve.  In addition, it would 
have a major chilling effect on advisory boards; governing boards would be greatly reluctant to 
appoint them or seek their advice if a member of the advisory board could bind the entity based on 
a statement that was deemed a promise after the fact.  Accordingly, this Court should determine 




B. The doctrine of promissory estoppel should not be applied upon the facts of this case. 
Even if this Court ultimately holds that it is possible to apply the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel against a governmental entity performing a governmental function under certain 
extraordinary circumstances (which it has yet to actually encounter), the application of this 
doctrine is not appropriate in this matter, and the District Court erred in allowing this doctrine to 
be considered by a jury.  This is because none of the statements made by persons acting, or 
purporting to act, on behalf of Bonner County were in fact promises, and Silverwing had no right 
to rely on those statements as promises.  In addition, the alleged promises were never made in the 
context of any agreement intended to be contractually binding on the parties, and therefore would 
not be appropriately used as a substitute for consideration.  Finally, the application of the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel in this matter would lead, and in the District Court did lead, to an unjust 
result. 
1. The statements alleged to be promises were not promises as a matter of law. 
Thousands of pages of clerk’s record, numerous pretrial motions, hundreds of pages of trial 
testimony, and hundreds of pages of exhibits admitted at trial all boil down to three statements that 
are alleged to have been promises Bonner County made to Silverwing: first, that the ALP provided 
to Silverwing in 2006 was the ALP that had been approved by the FAA; second, that the runway 
at the Sandpoint Airport would remain in its then-current location; and finally, that the taxiway 
Silverwing built with the County’s approval and at its own expense was in the correct place, as 
depicted in the ALP provided by the County.  R. at 1021-22; Trial Tr. p. 189, L. 21-p. 191, L. 14.  
(In her opening statement, counsel for Silverwing referred to two promises, combining the second 
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and third alleged promises outlined above.)  Silverwing has contended that it relied on those 
alleged promises to its detriment in constructing its development, including the taxiway in 
question.  R. at 1024-25; Trial Tr. p. 191, L. 15-p. 192, L. 4.  It has contended that it suffered 
damages in the form of lost sales resulting from the fact that the FAA had not approved the ALP 
provided by the County, leading to years of legal uncertainty until those issues were finally 
resolved in 2015.  R. at 1025, 3100; Trial Tr. p. 212, L. 12-p. 221, L. 18. 
It is axiomatic that for the doctrine of promissory estoppel to apply, there must have been 
a promise made.  Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n, 154 Idaho at 723, 302 P.3d at 348.  The 
determination of the absence of a promise may be made as a matter of law.  Id.  Here, the statements 
or actions referenced above do not on their face constitute promises, but the District Court failed 
to recognize this in its pretrial and post-trial rulings.  R. at 3063-65, 5738-41. 
The alleged “promise” regarding the ALP was in fact an action which, arguably at least, 
was combined with an implied representation that it had been approved by the FAA.  At worst, it 
was a misrepresentation by the County as to what had been approved by the FAA, but even if that 
were so, it would not automatically transmute that statement into a promise simply because it 
turned out not to be the case.  In fact, not only was it a representation of what was actually on the 
ground at the time, but it was also the ALP that the County wanted the FAA to approve at all times 
relevant to this matter.  There are also emails in the record involving the engineers that Silverwing 
had hired for the development project which indicate that they were aware of the actual FAA-
approved ALP even prior to the start of the project.  R. Exh. at 306-08 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 150); R. 
Exh. at 379-82 (Defendant’s Exhibits B8 and B9); R. Exh. at 403-07 (Defendant’s Exhibits E44 
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and E46).  The other statements were made later, but related to the issues as between the FAA-
approved ALP and the ALP provided to Silverwing as to the position of the runway vis-à-vis the 
position of the taxiway that Silverwing ultimately constructed. 
In addition, the persons who made the alleged promises were not persons who could legally 
bind the County.  Some of them were independent contractors retained by the County as an airport 
manager, engineer, and legal consultant; others were members of the Advisory Board; still others 
were individual members of the board of county commissioners.  R. at 746-56; Trial Tr. p. 483, L. 
3-20; p. 535, L. 21-p. 538, L. 13; p. 1079, L. 2-p. 1084, L. 4; p. 1131, L. 24-p. 1136, L. 15; p. 
1359, L. 8-p. 1360, L. 2; p. 1367, L. 18-p. 1369, L. 6.  However, only a properly constituted Board, 
acting as such, at a meeting complying with the requirements of the Open Meetings Law, can 
lawfully bind the County; any other means of doing so is void as a matter of law.  Idaho Code §§ 
31-706, 74-208.  Therefore, because the “promises” alleged in this case are not in fact the type of 
promises that could contractually bind the County, they cannot be bootstrapped into a binding 
obligation by operation of promissory estoppel, either. 
2. Silverwing had no right to rely on any of the statements alleged to be promises. 
Even if the statements in question were construed to be promises made by the persons who 
made the statements, Silverwing nevertheless had no right to rely on those statements as a matter 
of law.  As stated above, they were not made by a properly constituted Board, acting as a governing 
board, and were not made in compliance with the Open Meetings Law.  In addition, none of the 
persons making the alleged promises had actual authority or apparent authority to bind Bonner 
County, and in any event, the “promises” allegedly made were a nullity since they were within the 
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purview of the FAA, not the County, to fulfill.  Although this should have been decided in favor 
of the County as a matter of law, at trial the jury should have been instructed as to how a binding 
obligation can be made by a county, as this is a prerequisite for determining whether a promise 
was ever properly made that could be held binding against the County. 
a. None of the alleged promises were made in accordance with the Open 
Meetings Law, and are therefore not binding. 
As stated above, the record reflects that all of the alleged promises were made by persons 
acting outside of the scope of a properly noticed meeting, open to the public, where a quorum of 
the board of county commissioners were present to deliberate toward, and ultimately make a 
decision, in the presence of the public.  R. at 1047-48; R. Exh. at 82-84 (Plaintiff’s Exh. 32); Trial 
Tr. p. 299, L.2-p. 307, L. 19; p. 335, L. 10-p. 338, L. 9; p. 344, L. 6-p. 351, L. 13; p. 441, L. 9-20; 
p. 1094, L. 21-p. 1099, L. 21.  It cannot be repeated often enough that any such action is void – 
not merely voidable – under the abundantly clear provisions of the Open Meetings Law.  Idaho 
Code § 74-208; cf. Hampton, 43 P. at 325-26 (no recovery under quantum meruit theory when 
underlying contract was void). 
Although the law of promissory estoppel with respect to governmental entities is not yet 
well developed in Idaho, other jurisdictions that have considered this issue have uniformly held 
that persons who deal with governmental entities are charged with knowledge of how 
governmental entities can properly enter into binding obligations, and the constitutional and 
statutory limitations on their authority.  Trujillo, 747 P.2d at 917; Current Source, 813 N.E.2d at 
737; cf. Maloney v. Oakdale Cemetery Bd. of Trustees, 1993 WL 407302, at *2, *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 
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1993) (promissory estoppel does not apply if a governmental entity is acting outside the scope of 
its authority).  This Court should find these well-reasoned decisions to be persuasive, and in this 
case, it should find that Silverwing is properly charged with knowledge of how Bonner County 
can properly enter into a binding obligation, and the limitations placed on that authority under the 
Constitution and laws of the State of Idaho.  This fact alone precludes a finding that Silverwing 
had a reasonable and foreseeable right to rely on statements made outside the context of the 
decision-making process mandated under the Open Meetings Law.  Thus, the District Court erred 
in failing to instruct the jury as to this point of law, and erred in denying judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict when this issue was raised.  See R. at 4881-84, 5736-40. 
b. None of the persons who made the alleged promises had the legal authority 
to bind Bonner County. 
Despite the clear statutory language providing that the county commissioners have an 
exclusive duty to manage county property, including its airport, and providing the proper 
procedure for counties to enter into binding obligations, Silverwing has attempted an end run 
around these provisions by contending that the Board somehow gave several independent 
contractors, Advisory Board members, and individual members of the board of county 
commissioners “apparent authority” to make promises that would be binding on the County.  Trial 
Tr. p. 1503, L. 16-p. 1506, L. 14. 
To bind a principal, an agent must have either actual or apparent authority to do so.  Huyett 
v. Idaho State Univ., 140 Idaho 904, 908, 104 P.3d 946, 950 (2004).  Actual authority may be 
express or implied.  Id.  Express authority is given when a principal expressly authorizes an agent 
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to act on the principal’s behalf, while implied authority consists of those actions necessary to 
accomplish an expressly authorized act.  Id.  Here, Bonner County demonstrated that the Board 
never took official action that could be interpreted as providing express or implied authority to 
bind the County.  R. at 1841-2938; Trial Tr. p. 1131, L. 24-p. 1171, L. 19. 
Perhaps more importantly, though, the doctrine of apparent authority should not be applied 
against a governmental entity for much the same reasons as promissory estoppel should not be 
applied against a governmental entity.  Apparent authority occurs if a principal, whether by words 
or actions, “voluntarily places an agent in such a position that an ordinary person of business 
prudence would believe the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority.”  Huyett, 140 Idaho at 
908, 104 P.3d at 950.  Apparent authority cannot occur based solely on the actions of the purported 
agent.  Brown, 127 Idaho at 117, 898 P.2d at 48.  A finding of apparent authority may only be 
made “where the third party was not on notice of the scope of the agent’s actual authority.”  Huyett, 
140 Idaho at 908, 104 P.3d at 950 (emphasis added). 
In Huyett, a former basketball coach sued Idaho State University, alleging, inter alia, that 
ISU’s president had apparent authority to enter into a multi-year employment contract based on a 
State Board of Education policy allowing for such contracts, though an administrative rule of the 
Board of Education in effect at that time (then-IDAPA Personnel Rule 08.01.02.103.02.c) limited 
such contracts to one year except with prior approval of the board.  Id. at 906-07, 104 P.3d at 948-
49.  This Court found that the plaintiff “was deemed to know the law and effect of IDAPA over 
her negotiations for a multi-year employment contract with ISU” and, therefore, “she may not 
claim the university had apparent authority to enter into a multi-year contract.”  Id. at 908-09, 104 
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P.3d at 950-51.  Even after the IDAPA personnel rule in question was repealed, the university 
president’s authority to negotiate multi-year employment contracts was still expressly subject to 
approval of the Board of Education.  Id. at 909, 104 P.3d at 951. 
In this case, as in Huyett, Silverwing was on notice of the laws that provide that the ability 
to bind a county with respect to its property is vested solely in its board of county commissioners, 
and of the laws that provide that decisions regarding County property are to be made in open public 
meetings.  Unlike Huyett, which involved a Board of Education policy which was inconsistent 
with, and arguably contrary to, an IDAPA personnel rule, the statutes in question are clear and 
unambiguous, and have been in effect at all times relevant to this matter.  Because Silverwing was 
on notice of the scope of the actual authority of the various agents acting as representatives of the 
County, a finding that any of the Board’s agents had apparent authority to make promises binding 
the County is not appropriate. 
c. Bonner County lacked the legal authority to make promises regarding 
matters within the regulatory purview of the FAA. 
Finally, the alleged promises related to matters that, though subject to County approval, 
are subject to the ultimate approval authority of the FAA.  The FAA has exclusive jurisdiction 
over airspace nationwide.  49 U.S.C. § 40103.  Airport layout plans are subject to approval of the 
FAA.  49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(16); 14 C.F.R. § 151.5.  Likewise, through-the-fence agreements 
(TTFAs) are subject to FAA approval.  49 U.S.C. § 47107(s).  Failure to obtain FAA approval of 
any such items can lead to the loss of federal granting for that airport and any other airports under 
the entity’s jurisdiction.  49 U.S.C. § 47107(g)(2); 14 C.F.R. § 151.7. 
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In this case, there were actually two aspects of Silverwing’s development that the FAA 
found to be problematic.  One aspect was the issue on which Silverwing is basing its promissory 
estoppel claim, that being the position of the runway and taxiway with respect to the approved 
ALP.  R. Exh. at 241 (Plaintiff’s Exh. 114); 243-53 (Plaintiff’s Exh. 116); Trial Tr. passim.  The 
other aspect drawing the FAA’s ire, however, was the residential nature of the development, which 
the FAA considered to be incompatible with airport operations, even notwithstanding the 
collocation of airplane hangars with the residential units.  R. Exh. at 201-02 (Plaintiff’s Exh. 84), 
232-33 (Plaintiff’s Exh. 109); Trial Tr. p. 1266, L. 6-p. 1269, L. 3. 
Both the County and Silverwing made their best efforts to persuade the FAA to approve 
the TTFA associated with the development, and the County, at all times relevant to this matter, 
worked to persuade the FAA to adopt Alternative 2(b) as its ALP, which depicted the runway and 
taxiway in their actual location.  Thus, what is plain from the facts of the case is that both 
Silverwing and the County wanted the same thing; the FAA was the thorn in the side of both.  No 
matter what anyone purportedly acting on the County’s behalf may have said – or even promised 
– resolution of those issues was out of the County’s hands.  In fact, it literally took an Act of 
Congress for the issue related to the residential nature of the Silverwing development to be finally 
resolved.  See Pub. L. 112-95 § 136, 126 Stat. 23-24.  That paved the way for the FAA to finally 





d. The District Court failed to properly instruct the jury as to how a county 
can lawfully enter into a binding agreement. 
Although this matter should have been decided in favor of the County as a matter of law, 
at trial the jury should have been instructed as to how a binding obligation can be made by a county, 
as this is a prerequisite for determining whether a promise was ever properly made that could be 
held binding against the County.  Instead, the District Court committed reversible error when it 
rejected the jury instructions on this issue proposed by the County. 
Bonner County proposed six jury instructions that specifically related to the laws governing 
a county’s ability to enter into a binding contract, promise, or obligation.  R. at 4880-89.  The 
clerk’s record reflects that the Court gave proposed Instruction No. 73, which reads “Idaho law 
prohibits county commissioners from delegating their discretionary powers, and any attempt to do 
so is void,” Instruction No. 74, which reads “The management of property of the county is a duty 
expressly vested with the Board of County Commissioners, and the county commissioners are the 
only county officers empowered to manage and control that property,” and Instruction No. 76, 
which reads “Promissory estoppel ‘is generally not applicable to state agencies acting in a 
sovereign or governmental capacity,’ and applies only where required by notions of justice and 
fair play.”  R. at 4885-87, 4889.  Each of these instructions fairly states the law that it covers. 
However, at least some of the other instructions on this subject that the District Court 
refused should have also been given, based on the principles of law discussed above.  Proposed 
Instruction No. 71 was perhaps the most complete instruction regarding a county’s ability to enter 
into a binding obligation.  It reads as follows: 
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Promises are discretionary acts.  Bonner County cannot bind itself through 
promises made by County representatives or agents, even if there has been an 
attempt to delegate discretionary authority to those representatives or agents.  
Instead, as a government entity, Bonner County can only make a promise by an act 
of a vote of the Board of Commissioners for Bonner County that complies with the 
Idaho Open Meetings Law. 
All meetings of the board of commissioners must be public, and the books, records, 
and accounts of the meetings must be kept open for public inspection at the office 
of the clerk of the board of commissioners.  The clerk of the board must give five 
days public notice of all special and adjourned meetings by posting three notices in 
conspicuous places, one of which shall be the courthouse door. 
At a minimum the Plaintiff must have proven that the alleged promise was approved 
by a majority of the Bonner County Board of Commissioners during a duly noticed 
and properly conducted public meeting that satisfies all of the formal requirements 
of Idaho's Open Meetings Law.  Additionally, no decision of the County, including 
any promise, shall be given any effect unless written meeting minutes from that 
meeting reflected a motion and order which expressly approved the promise 
pursuant to the requirements of Idaho Code § 74-205. 
R. at 4881-82.  Proposed Instruction No. 72, which pertains to the inability of the Board to delegate 
its powers, reads as follows: 
The County is a “body corporate” whose powers can only be exercised by the Board 
of County Commissioners or by agents and officers acting under their authority, or 
authority of law.  The County Commissioners cannot delegate the power to make a 
promise on behalf of the County because promises are discretionary acts.  Also, 
even when the County Commissioners have delegated certain authority to agents 
and officers, such agents and officers must comply with the formalities of the Idaho 
Open Meetings Law. 
R. at 4883-84.  Proposed Instruction No. 75 pertains to findings of apparent authority when the 
principal is a governmental entity, and it reads “Idaho law holds that a party cannot claim that an 
agent or employee has apparent authority when the law provides that only the governing body of 
that agency has such authority.”  R. at 4888. 
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These instructions, had they been given, would have fairly and more completely reflected 
the law pertaining to this issue.  On the other hand, the District Court’s refusal to give these 
instructions caused the jury to have an incomplete picture of the applicable law, particularly with 
respect to the limitations on a governmental entity’s ability to enter into binding contracts, 
promises or obligations.  Therefore, this provides an additional basis for the reversal of the 
judgment entered in this case. 
3. The alleged promises were not part of any binding agreement, and therefore cannot 
be used as a substitute for consideration. 
As stated above, promissory estoppel acts as a substitute for consideration.  Gillespie, 138 
Idaho at 30, 56 P.3d at 1280.  It is not, however, a substitute for an agreement between the parties.  
Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 141 Idaho 362, 367, 109 P.3d 1104, 1109 (2005).  There must 
be proof of an agreement that is sufficiently definite as to constitute a binding, enforceable contract 
before promissory estoppel may act as a substitute for consideration.  Black Canyon Racquetball 
Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 178, 804 P.2d 900, 907 (1991). 
In reviewing the record and transcripts pertaining to this matter, one thing jumped out right 
away: What is the agreement in which promissory estoppel is to serve as a substitute for 
consideration?  Silverwing has never made that completely clear.  The most likely candidate is that 
the County allegedly promised that the airport’s runway would not be moved sixty feet to the west, 
in exchange for Silverwing’s commitment to build its development adjacent to the airport property.  
But if this is the case, such an agreement would have been illusory on both sides. 
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The County needed approval from the FAA 1) for a residential development adjacent to 
the airport, 2) for the TTFA appurtenant to the development, and 3) to change its ALP to reflect 
its desire not to move its runway sixty feet to the west.  To move the runway would have come at 
great expense to the county, and most likely would have required the exercise of eminent domain 
along the entire west side of the airport property (which was actually discussed with Silverwing at 
the height of the FAA’s intransigence).  On Silverwing’s part, it could have walked away from the 
development at any time, or refused the County’s request to build a portion of the taxiway 
eventually planned for the entire west side of the runway. 
Interestingly, Bonner County recognized this issue as well, and offered a jury instruction 
that covered that contingency.  Proposed Instruction No. 67 reads as follows: 
There must be an agreement separate and distinct from the Through the Fence 
Agreement between the parties in order for SilverWing to recover for promissory 
estoppel.  If you find there was no specific agreement between SilverWing and 
Bonner County, or that the only agreement was the Through the Fence Agreement, 
SilverWing cannot recover for promissory estoppel. 
R. at 4878.  This instruction was refused.  Id. 
In any event, the development was ultimately completed, federal law was changed to allow 
through-the-fence access for residential developments adjacent to or near an airport such as 
Silverwing’s, the ALP was successfully amended to reflect both current reality on the ground and 
the County’s future plans for the airport, and lots in the development are available for purchase 
now.  Everyone ended up where they wanted to be, notwithstanding the legal uncertainty 
admittedly endured for several years by both Silverwing and Bonner County at the hands of the 




4. The application of doctrine of promissory estoppel against Bonner County in this 
case would lead to an unjust result. 
The verdict in this matter was a classic case of “no good deed goes unpunished.”  
Promissory estoppel is supposed to only be applied where required by notions of justice and fair 
play.  R. at 4889; Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n, 154 Idaho at 723, 302 P.3d at 348.3  Although the 
jury was correctly instructed in that regard, its application of promissory estoppel worked an 
injustice against Bonner County because it led the jury to determine that the County was liable to 
Silverwing in the amount of $250,000 for alleged promises that could not lawfully bind the County 
and were not the cause of the protracted standoff with the FAA, which Silverwing and the County 
both had to endure, and which allegedly led to the lost sales that Silverwing is claiming as damages. 
The bottom line is that there were no broken promises here, as Silverwing contended in its 
opening statement.  The County and Silverwing were working toward the same end, but it was the 
FAA that put a monkey wrench into those efforts until Congress intervened.  The fact that a jury 
held Bonner County liable for those actions, and that the District Court allowed that jury the 
opportunity to do so, were indeed a manifest injustice. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Idaho Association of Counties, the amicus curiae in this matter, would like to thank 
this Court for the opportunity to support one of its member counties, Bonner County, in this matter 
                                            
3 To avoid confusion among jurors, however, it may be advisable to disavow the phrase “where required by notions 
of justice and fair play” and replace it with the phrase “to prevent manifest injustice,” as the standard was formulated 
in City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Hwy. Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 151, 879 P.2d 1078, 1084 (1994).  This change 




by providing additional points and authorities for the Court’s consideration.  As was stated in 
IAC’s request to file this brief, the ultimate decision that this Court makes will directly affect every 
county, and in fact every local government, in the state. 
IAC has grave concerns about the judgment entered in this matter because the District 
Court failed to properly apply relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, and case law 
precedents dating back nearly to statehood, regarding the manner in which a contract, agreement 
or promise can bind a county.  The doctrine of promissory estoppel should never be applied against 
a governmental entity because it is in direct contradiction of this longstanding principle.  At the 
very least, it should only be applied when the promise at issue was made in a meeting of the 
governing board duly convened and conducted in accordance with the Open Meetings Law, and a 
manifest injustice would result in the absence of its application.  If this Court were to affirm the 
District Court’s decision, it would have a seriously deleterious effect on the operations and 
finances of all local governments, and in particular, all forty-four Idaho counties. 
In this case, the necessary result is that the judgment of the District Court awarding 
damages to Plaintiff/Respondent Silverwing at Sandpoint, LLC in Case No. CV-2012-0840 should 
be REVERSED, and the case should be REMANDED to the District Court with instructions to 
enter judgment in favor of the Defendant/Respondent, Bonner County. 
Dated this 16th day of November, 2017. 
 
_______________________________________ 
Patrick M. Braden 
Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
Idaho Association of Counties 
 
43 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 34, I hereby certify that on this 16th day of November, 2017, I caused an 
original and six (6) bound copies of this brief to be sent via certified first class priority mail, 
postage prepaid, and an electronic copy via email to the address below, to be filed with the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court.  I further certify that except as otherwise indicated, I caused to be served 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing via certified first class priority mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Debora K. Kristensen 
Amber N. Dina 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Barbara E. Lichtman, Ph.D. 
Paul J. Fraidenburgh 
BUCHALTER 
18400 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 800 
Irvine, CA 92612-0514 
Scott P. Lewis 
David S. Mackey 
ANDERSON & KREIGER LLP 
50 Milk Street, 21st Floor 
Boston, MA 02109 
D. Scott Bauer 
Bonner County Prosecutor’s Office 
127 S. First Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(via email to the address below only) 
Darrin L. Murphey 
MURPHEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
402 W. Canfield Avenue, Suite 2 
Coeur d’Alene, ID 83815 
(via email to the address below only) 
 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 34.1, I further certify that I have sent a signed, electronic copy of this 
brief in searchable PDF format to the following e-mail addresses: 
Clerk of the Supreme Court sctbriefs@idcourts.net 
Debora K. Kristensen  dkk@givenspursley.com 
Amber N. Dina  amberdina@givenspursley.com 
Scott P. Lewis   slewis@andersonkreiger.com 
David S. Mackey  dmackey@andersonkreiger.com 
Barbara E. Lichman  blichman@buchalter.com 
Paul J. Fraidenburgh  pfraidenburgh@buchalter.com 
D. Scott Bauer   scott.bauer@bonnercountyid.gov 
Darrin L. Murphey  dmurphey@murpheylaw.com 
 
_______________________________________
Patrick M. Braden 
